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SOCIAL MEDIA, PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS, 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT* 
MARY-ROSE PAPANDREA** 
Education officials around the country are grappling with issues 
surrounding public school teachers’ use of social media. Typically 
concerned that social media makes it easier for teachers to engage in 
inappropriate communications with their students, officials have 
adopted guidelines that prohibit K-12 teachers from using social 
media to communicate with their students for noncurricular 
purposes. In addition, teachers are frequently punished for content 
they or others post on social media even when their students and the 
school community were not the intended audience. Current doctrine 
leaves unclear how much authority schools have to restrict their 
teachers’ use of social media to communicate with their students or 
to control what teachers post online. 
This Article contends that these issues involving social media 
magnify pre-existing problems with the First Amendment doctrine 
governing public employees generally and teachers in particular 
and argues that the doctrine needs significant revisions and 
clarifications. The Court’s decision under Garcetti v. Ceballos to 
strip public employees of their First Amendment rights for speech 
made “as employees” pursuant to their official job duties should be 
construed narrowly so that it applies only when teachers 
communicate with their students for school-related purposes. 
Furthermore, teachers should not have to demonstrate that their 
speech involves a matter of public concern to be entitled to First 
Amendment protection. Instead, this Article argues that in cases 
involving noncurricular speech that relates to the workplace, courts 
should apply a robust version of the Pickering balancing test that 
recognizes the value of teacher expression even when it does not 
involve a matter of public concern and that does not permit a hostile 
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community reaction to figure into the calculus. In cases involving 
non-school-related expression, this Article contends that courts 
should abandon the balancing test and instead give the speech 
presumptive constitutional protection that can be overcome only if 
school officials can demonstrate a significant nexus between that 
speech and the teacher’s fitness and ability to perform professional 
duties. 
With the First Amendment doctrine governing public school 
teachers reformed in this way, broad social media bans that restrict 
or prohibit a teacher’s use of social media to communicate with 
students for non-school-related purposes would be unconstitutional, 
and the ability of school officials to punish teachers for their online 
expression would not be as virtually unlimited as it currently is.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Ashley Payne was a 24-year-old public high school English 
teacher in Georgia when her principal called her into his office to tell 
her that she could be suspended because of content on her personal 
Facebook page.1 The objectionable content? Standard tourist 
photographs of Payne drinking alcohol in European beer gardens and 
cafés during a recent vacation and a comment that she was attending 
a trivia contest called “Crazy Bitch Bingo” at a local restaurant.2 
Even though Payne used Facebook’s privacy settings, the principal 
had learned about the content from an anonymous email claiming 
one of Payne’s students had seen the pictures and the profanity.3 
Around the country, public school districts have punished 
teachers like Ms. Payne for content they or others posted on social 
media sites. For example, a Virginia teacher who created artwork 
using body parts was fired when school officials learned of it;4 a 
Nashville teacher was fired after posting “racy” photos of herself on 
her MySpace profile page;5 a Spanish teacher in Pittsburgh was 
suspended for a month without pay when a fellow teacher posted a 
picture of her on Facebook with a stripper at a bachelorette party;6 
and a Wisconsin middle-school teacher was placed on administrative 
leave for posting a picture of herself with a gun on her Facebook 
page.7 In other cases, teachers have found their jobs in jeopardy after 
 
 1. Maureen Downey, Court Rules Against Ashley Payne in Facebook Case. But More 
to Come., ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 10, 2011, 7:36 PM), http://blogs.ajc.com/get-schooled-
blog/2011/10/10/court-rules-against-ashley-payne-in-facebook-case/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Maureen Downey, Barrow Teacher Done in by Anonymous “Parent” Email 
About Her Facebook Page, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 13, 2009, 3:12 PM), http://blogs.ajc 
.com/get-schooled-blog/2009/11/13/barrow-teacher-done-in-by-anonymous-e-mail-with-
perfect-punctuation/. 
 4. See Complaint at 7–10, Murmer v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 3:07CV608 
(E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2007), 2007 WL 2914769. For more about the case, see Teacher Hopes To 
Get Back at Va. District, FIRST AMEND. CENTER (Oct. 6, 2007), http://www 
.firstamendmentcenter.org/teacher-hopes-to-get-back-at-va-district-that-fired-him-over-
butt-art. 
 5. Michael D. Simpson, The Whole World (Wide Web) Is Watching, NEA TODAY, 
Apr. 2008, at 17, 17, available at http://www.nea.org/home/12784.htm. 
 6. Settlement Reached in Teacher’s Stripper Photo Suspension, WPXI.COM 
(Pittsburgh) (Aug. 17, 2010, 8:47 AM), http://www.wpxi.com/news/24657376/detail.html 
(explaining how the American Civil Liberties Union sued the school district on the 
teacher’s behalf and achieved reinstatement, back pay, and a monetary award). 
 7. Tony Galli, Teacher Placed on Leave for Questionable Facebook Posting, 
WKOW.COM (Madison, Wis.) (Feb. 3, 2009, 4:36 PM), http://www.wkow.com/Global/story 
.asp?S=9781795&nav=menu1362_10. 
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school officials learned that they complained about their students or 
schools on social media sites8 or made controversial statements about 
topics unrelated to their schools or their teaching.9 
In most of these cases, the teachers did not intend to 
communicate with their students or other members of their school 
communities through social media. Some teachers, like Ms. Payne, 
thought they had used privacy settings on their pages that would 
prevent students from seeing them,10 or, like the Virginia body-part 
artist, had taken great efforts to disguise their identity to prevent their 
students from discovering their work.11 Others simply relied on the 
“practical obscurity” the Internet provides.12 
In an effort to avoid the possibility of inappropriate 
communications with students, some states and school districts have 
adopted laws or policies restricting electronic communication 
between teachers and students, some of which require teachers to 
communicate with students only through school-provided or school-
approved technology and/or provide that online communications 
must be limited to school related matters.13 Other laws ban teachers 
 
 8. See, e.g., Maureen Downey, Facebook and Teachers: Still a Potentially Dangerous 
Combination for Your Career, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 23, 2010, 8:52 AM), http://blogs 
.ajc.com/get-schooled-blog/2010/08/23/facebook-and-teachers-still-a-potentially-dangerous 
-combination-for-your-career/ (discussing a number of cases where teachers have been 
punished for their speech in social media, including a Massachusetts school administrator 
who resigned after school officials discovered that she had said on her Facebook page that 
the parents in her upscale town were “arrogant” and “snobby” and that she was not 
looking forward to the start of school). 
 9. See, e.g., Tim Padgett, A Teacher Is Back in Class After Anti-Gay Diatribe, but Did 
He Really Win?, TIME (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599, 
2091038,00.html (discussing high school teacher Jerry Buell, a devout Baptist and 
American history teacher at a public high school in Florida, who wrote on his personal 
Facebook page “that gay marriage is a ‘cesspool’ that makes him vomit and mocks God”). 
 10. Did the Internet Kill Privacy?, CBSNEWS (Feb. 6, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www 
.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/02/06/sunday/main7323148.shtml. 
 11. Teacher Hopes To Get Back at Va. District, supra note 4. 
 12. Kayla Webley, How One Teacher’s Angry Blog Sparked a Viral Classroom 
Debate, TIME (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2052123,00 
.html (recounting how a teacher who wrote a blog critical of schools “maintains what she 
wrote was meant only to serve as amusement for herself, her husband and seven of her 
friends who read the site”). 
 13. Some policies require teachers to use social networks that the school or district 
either hosts or has approved. See, e.g., CMTY. UNIT SCH. DIST. 200, ILL., BOARD OF 
EDUCATION POLICY MANUAL 5:135 (2010), available at http://www.barrington220.org 
/cms/lib2/IL01001296/Centricity/ModuleInstance/5958/Section5-7.11.pdf (stating that 
employees may communicate with parents and students online only about school-related 
matters and only through district-approved networks); cf. MASS. ASSOC. OF SCH. COMM., 
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from “friending” students in social media networks or otherwise 
giving students access to their social media profiles.14 Still other 
regulations warn school employees that they may be subject to 
discipline if they use any social networking site inappropriately, even 
if the content is not directed at students and does not relate to 
 
POLICY ON FACEBOOK AND SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES FOR MILTON PUBLIC 
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 1 (2011), available at http://www.miltonps.org/documents 
/SCPolicyIJNDD.pdf (requiring that all Internet contacts be made through the school 
email system). Other policies provide that teachers can use electronic media to 
communicate with students or other members of the school community about school-
related business only. See, e.g., CHI. PUB. SCH., ILL., CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS POLICY 
MANUAL: ACCEPTABLE USE OF THE CPS NETWORK AND COMPUTER RESOURCES 5 
(2009), available at http://policy.cps.k12.il.us/documents/604.1.pdf (explaining that all 
emails sent by users in their capacity as representatives of the Chicago Public Schools must 
be sent from Board-authorized email systems); DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., OHIO, DAYTON 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS POLICY MANUAL: ACCEPTABLE USE AND INTERNET SAFETY FOR 
INFORMATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY 1–2 (2010), available at http://www 
.nctq.org/docs/Dayton_Policy_manual_app_2009_doc_23_5_1418.pdf (providing that 
teachers cannot respond to student-initiated conversations through social media not 
approved by the district); ECTOR CNTY., TEX., INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK (2011–2012) 49, available at http://www.ectorcountyisd.org/17661 
0728111231193/lib/176610728111231193/ecisd-employeehandbook.pdf (“An employee 
may use electronic media to communicate with a student within the scope of the 
professional responsibilities of his or her job.”). 
 14. See Katherine Bindley & Timothy Stenovec, Missouri “Facebook Law” Limits 
Teacher-Student Interactions Online, Draws Criticism and Praise, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 3, 2011, 8:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/03/missouri-facebook-
law_n_916716.html; see also DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., OHIO, supra note 13, at 1–2 (stating 
that employees may not “friend” students on social media sites unless they are related to 
the student and that they may not instant message or text current students or respond to 
student-initiated conversations through social media not approved by the district); 
GRANITE SCH. DIST., SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, SOCIAL NETWORKING POLICY, ART. 
X.C.3. (2010), available at http://www.graniteschools.org/districtpolicies 
/teachinglearningservices/Educational%20Technology/3.%20Social%20Networking%20p
olicy.pdf (explaining that employees may not allow students to access personal social 
networking sites); L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., POLICY BULLETIN 3 (Feb. 1, 2012), available 
at http://www.lausd.net/lausd/offices/Office_of_Communications/BUL-5688.0_SOCIAL 
_MEDIA_POLICY.pdf (accepting invitations to non-school-related social networking 
sites from “parents, students, or alumni under 18 is strongly discouraged”); MASS. ASSOC. 
OF SCH. COMM., supra note 13, at 1 (stating that teachers, staff, and coaches may not list 
current students as “friends” on social networking sites); SCH. BD. OF PINELLAS CNTY., 
FLA., BYLAWS AND POLICIES, COMMUNICATIONS WITH STUDENTS VIA ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA 253 (2012), available at http://web.pcsb.org/Planning/neola/NewBoardPolicy 
_Entire.pdf (requiring that employees communicate with students only by school-provided 
electronic devices and services); WEYMOUTH PUB. SCH., MASS., EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK 
23 (2012), available at http://www.weymouthschools.org/uploadedFiles/District_Forms 
_and_Information/Handbooks/Emp%20Handbook%2011-12[1].pdf (requiring that 
electronic communication between personnel and students must be for educational 
purposes only and that school staff may not share personal webpages or social media with 
current students). 
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school.15 While these laws and policies have typically been passed in 
reaction to revelations that teachers had used social media to lure 
students into sexual relationships,16 these social media bans and 
restrictions are troublesome given the rapidly increasing importance 
of social media a as communication platform and the growing 
recognition that social media can be an important pedagogical tool. 
Rather than attacking the inappropriate contact itself, these efforts 
single out a means of communication.  
Although few cases involving teachers and social media have 
proceeded to judgment,17 it is only a matter of time before the current 
trickle of cases becomes a torrent. Unfortunately, the doctrine 
governing teacher speech rights is nothing short of confusing. Current 
doctrine leaves unclear how much authority schools have to restrict 
their teachers’ use of social media to communicate with their students 
or to control what teachers post online. The Supreme Court’s 
framework for analyzing free speech rights of public employees—like 
public school teachers—strips First Amendment protection from 
speech they make “as employees” pursuant to their official job 
duties.18 The Supreme Court left unclear whether this rule applies in 
the educational context given concerns about academic freedom; the 
Court also left unexplained how a court should determine whether 
expression is pursuant to “official” job duties. In addition, it appears 
that speech must involve a matter of public concern to receive 
constitutional protection, although the Court and the lower courts 
have left it unclear whether this is required in cases involving non-
work-related expression. And even if employees can survive these 
two threshold tests, employees still cannot prevail unless they can 
demonstrate that their interest in the speech and the value of the 
speech outweigh the government’s interest in restricting it. 
For teachers, the uncertainty does not end there. Some courts 
have applied the framework developed for student speech rights to 
 
 15. See BD. OF EDUC., SOMERVILLE, N.J., 3000 SERIES: TEACHING STAFF MEMBERS: 
INAPPROPRIATE STAFF CONDUCT § 3281 (2005), available at http://www.somervillenjk12 
.org/cms/lib5/NJ01001815/Centricity/Domain/351/3000%20Series.pdf (stating that school 
staff members are “advised to be concerned about” the use of emails, text messages, social 
networking sites, or any medium “that is directed and/or available to pupils or for public 
display”); L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., supra note 14, at 3 (warning that school employees 
who engage in the “inappropriate use” of social networking sites are subject to discipline). 
 16. See Bindley & Stenovec, supra note 14.  
 17. See, e.g., Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *1, *15–16 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
 18. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
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teachers’ in-school expression and have permitted schools to punish 
teachers for any speech that interferes with legitimate pedagogical 
goals.19 Although it is unclear whether this alternative framework is 
more or less speech protective than the public employee framework, 
the reality is that neither doctrine offers teachers much protection for 
their curricular and extracurricular speech. 
Part I discusses the increasingly important role social media is 
playing in public schools around the country and the various 
objections some school officials and parents have to this 
development. Part II discusses the uncertainty regarding the 
appropriate doctrinal framework for analyzing the First Amendment 
claims of public school teachers. Although the Supreme Court has 
developed separate frameworks for analyzing the speech rights of 
government employees and public school students, the lower courts 
disagree about which of these frameworks applies to public school 
teachers. Part III argues that the public employee speech doctrine 
should apply in cases involving teachers, but this framework requires 
significant clarifications and revisions. The Court’s decision to strip 
public employees of their First Amendment rights for speech made 
“as employees” pursuant to their official job duties should be 
construed narrowly so that it applies only when teachers use social 
media to communicate with their students for school-related 
purposes. Furthermore, teachers should not have to demonstrate that 
their speech involves a matter of public concern in order to bring a 
First Amendment claim. In cases involving school-related speech, 
courts should apply a vigorous balancing test that weighs the value of 
the speech against the government’s interest in regulation. Moreover, 
courts should not permit a hostile community reaction to factor into 
the calculus. Most importantly, courts should not apply a balancing 
test to expression that is not school-related but should instead afford 
this noncurricular speech presumptive constitutional protection. This 
presumption can be overcome only if school officials can demonstrate 
a significant nexus between the speech and the teacher’s fitness and 
ability to perform her educational duties.  
Under this proposed approach, broad social media bans that 
restrict or prohibit a teacher’s use of social media to communicate 
with students would be unconstitutional. In addition, schools would 
find it more difficult to punish teachers for the things they say and do 
on social media. At the same time, this approach would still not 
 
 19. See infra Part II.C. 
PAPANDREA.FPP 5/8/2012 2:07 PM 
1604 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
 
 
provide teachers the First Amendment rights ordinary citizens enjoy. 
Schools would maintain the power to restrict student-teacher 
conversations that are truly harmful and to punish teachers who 
engage in expression that reveals them to be unfit for the profession. 
I.  SOCIAL MEDIA IN SCHOOLS 
The role of social media in public schools is currently a divisive 
issue. Although it is increasingly common for school officials around 
the country—from individual schools20 to school districts21 to the U.S. 
Department of Education22—to use social media sites like Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube to communicate with students, parents, and 
the interested public about school-related events and issues,23 the use 
of social media by teachers to communicate with their students is 
highly controversial. In addition, teachers who use social media in 
their personal lives have faced severe punishments for posting 
content that school officials claim interferes with a school’s 
educational mission, sets a bad example for students, or is otherwise 
inappropriate or unprofessional. 
A. Pedagogical Uses 
Given that 73% of children ages 12–17 use social media and even 
elementary school students use social media websites like WebKinz 
and Club Penguin,24 it is not surprising that some educators have 
embraced social media as a valuable pedagogical tool.25 Many 
teachers around the country have successfully integrated various 
social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook into their 
 
 20. See Kimberly Melton, Schools Use Facebook, Twitter to Get Out Their Message, 
OREGONLIVE.COM (Sept. 24, 2009, 6:22 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/education/index 
.ssf/2009/09/schools_turn_to_facebook_twitt.html. 
 21. See, e.g., CHAPEL HILL-CARRBORO CITY SCHS., http://www2.chccs.k12.nc.us 
/education/components/board/ (last visited May 8, 2012) (providing links to the school 
district’s Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr pages). 
 22. See, e.g., US Dept of Education, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/usedgov (Twitter 
feed for the U.S. Department of Education). 
 23. Michelle R. Davis, Social Networking Goes to School, EDUC. WK.: DIGITAL 
DIRECTIONS (June 14, 2010), http://www.edweek.org/dd/articles/2010/06/16/03networking 
.h03.html. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See generally Heather L. Carter, Teresa S. Foulger & Ann Dutton Ewbank, Have 
You Googled Your Teacher Lately? Teachers’ Use of Social Networking Sites, 89 PHI 
DELTA KAPPAN 681 (2008) (explaining how increasing numbers of teachers are using 
social media in their classrooms and personal lives). 
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classrooms, and their reasons for doing so vary.26 These teachers 
claim that social media allows them to improve communication with 
their students individually and as a class.27 Some teachers use 
Facebook and other social media websites to remind students about 
homework assignments and tests.28 Teachers have also discovered 
that social media tools like Facebook make it easier for students to 
complete group projects and to continue the dialogue about their 
schoolwork outside of the classroom.29 In addition, social media helps 
teachers reach and engage shy students who are more willing to 
contribute to the class conversation if they can do so anonymously or 
at least not in person in the classroom.30 
Participating in social media can enhance communication and 
collaboration, facilitate social interaction, promote creativity, and 
help develop writing and technical skills.31 For example, a pilot 
project in North Carolina public schools allows students to use their 
smart phones to communicate with their math teachers outside of 
school hours; in addition, students may collaborate with their fellow 
students through instant messages, blogs, and videos explaining how 
they solved a problem.32 As a result of this project, students have 
reported they are more motivated and interested in math, and greater 
numbers have demonstrated proficiency in math.33 
Social media also may help teachers and administrators reach 
troubled students who need more than just help with their academic 
work.34 Teachers can provide needed emotional attention and moral 
support to overcome personal problems, such as abuse or family 
 
 26. See Jessica Gross, Embracing the Twitter Classroom, HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 
2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jessica-gross/embracing-the-twitter-cla_b_204463 
.html. 
 27. Carter et al., supra note 25, at 682–83. 
 28. Id. at 683. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 682–83; see also Gross, supra note 26 (noting that shy students are more 
willing to speak up online). 
 31. Davis, supra note 23. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Tina Barseghian, Mobile Learning Proves to Benefit At-Risk Students, 
MIND/SHIFT (July 20, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://mindshift.kqed.org/2011/07/mobile-learning-
proves-to-benefit-at-risk-students/. Outside of the classroom, student club organizers have 
also found social media to be an effective way of attracting, retaining, and communicating 
with their members. See Carter et al., supra note 25, at 683. 
 34. David Murphy, Missouri Bans Student-Teacher Facebook Friendships, 
PCMAG.COM (July 31, 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2389485,00.asp. 
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difficulties.35 Students looking for adult mentoring and guidance 
might find it difficult to connect with a teacher during school hours; 
social networks can offer an easier and more approachable method of 
reaching teachers and school officials.36 
Additionally, more and more schools are recognizing the 
importance of bringing social media into the classroom so that young 
people can learn how to use social media safely and effectively.37 
These educational efforts include teaching students about the dangers 
of sexting and cyberbullying; the potential for reputational harm; 
threats to students’ privacy and safety that might result from posting 
personal or inappropriate information; the social isolation and 
depression that might result from spending too much time on 
Facebook and other social media websites; and the undue influence 
of websites that promote unsafe and self-destructive behaviors like 
bulimia, drug use, and self-cutting.38 Schools can also play an 
important role in educating students about plagiarism, intellectual 
property rights, the credibility of sources of information, and 
responsible digital citizenship generally.39 
B. Teachers’ Use of Social Media in Their Professional and Personal 
Lives 
Like students, teachers can also benefit from using social media 
outside of the classroom in their professional and personal capacities. 
As professionals, some teachers use social media to connect with 
other teachers, communicate with their unions, and learn more about 
innovative teaching techniques.40 In their personal lives, teachers can 
use social media to keep in touch with their friends and family and to 
make connections with those with whom they have fallen out of 
 
 35. danah boyd, When Teachers and Students Connect Outside School, APOPHENIA 
(May 27, 2009), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2009/05/27/when_teachers_a 
.html. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Sarah Kessler, The Case for Social Media in Schools, MASHABLE (Sept. 29, 2010), 
http://mashable.com/2010/09/29/social-media-in-school/; see also Gross, supra note 26 
(discussing benefits of using social media in the classroom). 
 38. Social Media and Kids: Some Benefits, Some Worries, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS 
(Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/Pages/Social-
Media-and-Kids-Some-Benefits,-Some-Worries.aspx. 
 39. Stephanie Clifford, Teaching About Web Includes Troublesome Parts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/education/09cyberkids.html. 
 40. Davis, supra note 23. 
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touch.41 Although most social media connections reflect pre-existing 
offline connections, social media also brings together strangers with 
similar hobbies, interests, and political views.42 
Numerous teachers have faced discipline for posting what school 
officials regard as inappropriate and unprofessional content on social 
media, even though the content was posted during their personal 
time.43 School officials have punished teachers for posting content 
that sets a poor example for their students because it involves sex, 
drugs, alcohol, or profanity.44 In other instances, school districts have 
punished teachers and other school employees for content on social 
media sites that casts their schools in a negative light. This expression 
might take the form of negative comments about the school or 
students45 or offensive comments about non-school-related topics.46 
Although perhaps some teachers post this sort of content 
knowing that school administrators will see it, anyone who places 
information in digital form runs the risk that an unintended audience 
will discover it.47 To avoid the problems of controlling the audience 
for their information, some teachers simply avoid using social media 
entirely or engage in significant self-censorship to post only the most 
benign content.48 Even the teachers who take this conservative 
approach to social media, however, have no control over the 
 
 41. Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 15, 
2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/Why%20Americans 
%20Use%20Social%20Media.pdf. 
 42. danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 210 (2008), available at http://jcmc 
.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html. 
 43. See Carter et al., supra note 25, at 682–83. 
 44. Id. at 683. 
 45. Zach Patberg & Carol Lawrence, Facebook Comments Prompt Parents to Remove 
Children from Teacher’s Class, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www 
.northjersey.com/news/119115024_Facebook_comments_prompt_parents_to_remove_chil
dren_from_teacher_s_class.html (giving numerous examples of teachers who were 
punished for making derogatory comments about their students). 
 46. See, e.g., Padgett, supra note 9 (discussing a teacher who made offensive anti-gay 
marriage comments on Facebook). 
 47. Lance Ulanoff, Your Digital Debris Is Haunting You, PCMAG.COM (June 9, 
2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386635,00.asp. 
 48. See Frederic D. Stutzman & Woodrow N. Hartzog, Boundary Regulation in Social 
Media 5 (Oct. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1566904. Indeed, many educators suggest that teachers should 
avoid social media entirely. See, e.g., Jodi Weigand, Pitfalls Await Teachers Who Publicize 
Lives on Social Media, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV. (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www 
.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/state/s_752099.html. 
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information others may post about them.49 Furthermore, many active 
users of social media sites discover that the design of these platforms 
makes it difficult for them to control the disclosure of information in 
the same way they can in the offline world.50 
With more than 800 million users, Facebook is the world’s most 
popular social networking website.51 It is not surprising, then, that 
Facebook frequently plays a role in cases where teachers are 
punished for posting inappropriate content.52 But another reason 
Facebook is so often involved in these cases is that it is difficult for 
users to present multiple personas to different audiences.53 Indeed, 
until May 2008, family, friends, acquaintances, work colleagues, and 
professional contacts were all merged online as a single social group 
and all indiscriminately labeled “friends.”54 Although Facebook now 
allows users to place contacts into different “lists” of friends, this 
process is imperfect and burdensome, especially for those who are not 
tech-savvy.55 Furthermore, information on Facebook is public by 
default.56 Even when Facebook users believe they are using the 
 
 49. See, e.g., Settlement Reached with School District over Teacher Who Was 
Suspended over Photo with Stripper at Bachelorette Party, ACLU (Aug. 17, 2010), http:// 
www.aclu.org/free-speech/settlement-reached-school-district-over-teacher-who-was-
suspended-over-photo-stripper-ba; Update: Jacksonville Teacher Resigns, KETK NBC 
(Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.ketknbc.com/news/update-jacksonville-teacher-resigns (noting 
that a teacher resigned after someone else posted inappropriate pictures of her online). 
 50. Paul Adams, Slideshow Presentation at the Voices That Matter Web Design 
Conference: The Real Life Social Network v2, slides 188–206 (June 2010), available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/padday/the-real-life-social-network-v2. 
 51. Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies 
/facebook_inc/index.htm (last updated Apr. 9, 2012). 
 52. Harry Ess Belch, Teachers Beware! The Dark Side of Social Networking, 
LEARNING & LEADING WITH TECH., Dec.–Jan. 2011–2012, at 15, 16, available at http:// 
www.iste.org/learn/publications/learning-and-leading/issues/Feature_Teachers_Beware 
_The_Dark_Side_of_Social_Networking.aspx (listing several examples involving 
Facebook). 
 53. Jens Binder, Andrew Howes & Alistair Sutcliffe, The Problem of Conflicting 
Social Spheres: Effects of Network Structure on Experienced Tension in Social Network 
Sites, CHI, 2009, at 965, 967 (Apr. 7, 2009). 
 54. Id. 
 55. For a discussion of Facebook’s “list” function and recent efforts to improve it, see 
Jason Kincaid, Facebook Officially Unveils Smart Friend Lists, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 13, 
2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/09/13/facebook-officially-unveils-smart-friend-lists/. 
Some of these efforts have been a response to newcomer Google+’s “Circles,” which 
allows users to organize contacts into groups. Id. Google+ Circles may represent an 
improvement, but using it can be tedious and inconvenient. See Peter Pachal, Google 
Circles: The Dumbest Thing About Google+, PCMAG.COM (June 29, 2011), http://www 
.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2387808,00.asp. 
 56. Why Facebook Won’t Be Number One Forever: The Oversimplification of Identity 
Online Through the Blurring of ‘Selves,’ ONLINE CONF. ON NETWORKS & CMTYS. (Apr. 
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maximum privacy settings Facebook offers—and therefore having 
“private” conversations with friends—these privacy settings are 
notoriously unreliable and easily bypassed.57 Social science research 
demonstrates that although people frequently intend to share 
personal information with a small subset of their “friends,” they end 
up sharing information with many more people than they would 
offline.58 
In addition to privacy and access controls, some social media 
users rely on a number of methods of “boundary regulation” to 
control the audience for their content.59 These methods include 
anonymous or pseudonymous participation; the maintenance of 
multiple social profiles or the use of multiple social media sites; and 
reliance on the “practical obscurity” of most material on the 
Internet.60 None of these methods is perfect, and teachers around the 
country have paid the price for this imperfection when parents, 
students, and school officials see content that teachers often did not 
intend for those audiences.61 
C. Resistance to Social Media in Schools 
Despite the pervasive use of social media in society generally,62 
some school administrators and parents contend that using social 
media in schools causes more harm than good.63 In addition to 
questioning the effectiveness of integrating technology into the 
classroom,64 some express concern that encouraging students to use 
 
24, 2011), http://networkconference.netstudies.org/2011/04/why-facebook-won’t-be-
number-one-forever-the-oversimplification-of-identity-online-through-the-blurring-of-
‘selves’/. 
 57. Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-
timeline. 
 58. See Why Facebook Won’t Be Number One Forever: The Oversimplification of 
Identity Online Through the Blurring of ‘Selves,’ supra note 56. Although on average 
Facebook users have 180 “friends,” they tend to interact regularly with only four to six 
people. See Adams, supra note 50, at slide 105. 
 59. See Stutzman & Hartzog, supra note 48, at 13–15. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See supra text accompanying notes 10–12. 
 62. A recent survey reported that sixty-six percent of online adults use social 
networking websites like Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, or MySpace. See Smith, supra note 
41. 
 63. Davis, supra note 23. Indeed, many schools still block access to popular social 
networks like Twitter and Facebook. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., Matt Richtel, In Classroom of Future, Stagnant Scores, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/technology/technology-in-schools-faces-
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social media will lead to more online harassment and sexual 
predators.65 Others are worried that using social media as an 
educational tool intrudes inappropriately into the personal and social 
lives of students and undermines the appropriate professional 
boundary between teacher and student.66 
Increasingly, school officials around the country have become so 
concerned about this boundary issue that they have adopted school 
policies forbidding or heavily restricting teachers’ use of social media 
to contact students.67 These policies vary widely and reflect school 
officials’ uncertainty about social media. Some of the more extreme 
policies require that school employees use only their school email 
accounts to communicate with students or use social media to 
communicate with their students only about school-related matters.68 
Others mandate that employees not “friend” students or otherwise 
give them access to their personal webpages or social media 
networks.69 
II.  FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF K-12 PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS 
Courts have not yet adopted a consistent framework for cases 
involving teachers and social media. Although the Supreme Court has 
a relatively well-developed line of cases addressing the First 
Amendment rights of public employees, some lower courts have 
instead applied the Supreme Court’s decisions made in the context of 
student speech rights. As more cases involving teachers and social 
media work their way through the judicial system, courts will first 
have to determine the proper doctrinal framework for analyzing these 
kinds of claims. The following Part examines these two frameworks 
 
questions-on-value.html?pagewanted=all (reporting that although schools spend billions 
on new technology, proving the educational value of such tools is difficult). 
 65. Davis, supra note 23. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Jennifer Preston, Rules to Stop Pupil and Teacher from Getting Too Social Online, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at A1. 
 68. See, e.g., CHI. PUB. SCH., supra note 13, at 5 (“Users are not allowed to use third-
party email systems . . . in their capacity as representatives of Chicago Public Schools.”); 
MASS. ASSOC. OF SCH. COMM., supra note 13, at 1 (“All e-contacts with students should 
be through the district’s computer and telephone system.”); Alexander Russo, School 
Board Bans Facebook, Twitter for Teachers, CHICAGONOW (Aug. 10, 2009, 8:16 AM), 
http://www.chicagonow.com/district-299-chicago-public-schools-blog/2009/08/school-
board-bans-facebook-twitter-for-teachers/ (“[R]equiring teachers to use official email for 
all communications with students.”). 
 69. DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., OHIO, supra note 13, at 1–2 (stating that employees 
cannot “friend” students unless they are related or are a legal guardian). 
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with a focus on where they are unclear and how, in practice, they 
differ from each other. 
A. Current Doctrinal Framework for Public Employees 
For decades, courts commonly understood that the First 
Amendment placed no restrictions on the ability of the government 
to discipline its employees based on their expressive activities.70 The 
basis for this understanding was a right-privilege distinction; in other 
words, being a public school teacher is a privilege, not a right, and the 
government is free to condition the exercise of that privilege on the 
relinquishment of constitutional rights.71 As Oliver Wendell Holmes 
famously said while serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk 
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”72 
Over time, the Supreme Court’s reliance on the right-privilege 
distinction diminished, and the Court instead required any 
restrictions on teachers and other public employees to pass 
constitutional scrutiny.73 Cases involving public school teachers (on 
the secondary and university level) played an important role in this 
development. For example, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,74 the 
Court struck down a McCarthy-era law that required university 
faculty members to certify that they were not members of communist 
or other subversive organizations.75 The Court explained that “the 
First Amendment . . . does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom. The vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community 
of American schools.”76 
The watershed case for the First Amendment rights of public 
school teachers and public employees more generally came in 1968 
when the Court decided Pickering v. Board of Education.77 This case 
 
 70. See William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in 
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439–40 (1968). 
 71. Id. 
 72. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 73. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1973) (holding that it is well settled 
that government employment cannot be denied or penalized “on a basis that infringes [the 
employee’s] constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of 
speech”). 
 74. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 75. Id. at 608–10. 
 76. Id. at 603 (internal citations omitted). 
 77. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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involved a public school teacher who wrote a letter to the editor of a 
local newspaper criticizing the school board’s funding allocations.78 
The Pickering Court explicitly held that public employees retained a 
First Amendment right to make statements of public concern even 
when they involve the subject matter of their employment.79 
Recognizing that teachers’ First Amendment rights are not absolute, 
the Court established a balancing test that considered “the interests 
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”80 Although the Court was unwilling to go so far as to 
offer public employees the same protection that ordinary citizens 
enjoy for their contributions to public debate, the Court recognized 
that public employees, as a class, can offer valuable insights and 
opinions regarding the government enterprise in which they are 
employed.81 Applying its new balancing test to the facts at hand, the 
Pickering Court first noted that the teacher’s letter was not directed 
toward his immediate supervisors or coworkers and therefore did not 
threaten to undermine discipline or harmony in the workplace.82 
Furthermore, the Court explained, the teacher’s letter did not 
interfere with the operation of the school system in any way or 
undermine his ability to perform his daily duties as a teacher.83 The 
Court concluded the government had no greater interest in 
suppressing his speech than it would have in suppressing the same 
speech by a member of the general public.84  
Pickering recognizes the important contributions government 
employees can make to public debate and in some cases offers 
meaningful protection for those contributions. As with any balancing 
test, however, the outcome of any particular case will depend on the 
facts at issue. Indeed, Pickering itself made this clear with its constant 
references to the circumstances of that case85 and caveats that the 
 
 78. Id. at 564–65. 
 79. Id. at 571–72. 
 80. Id. at 568. 
 81. Id. (noting that teachers as a class are often in the best position to make valuable 
contributions to the public debate about school funding issues). 
 82. Id. at 569–70. 
 83. Id. at 572–73. 
 84. Id. at 574. 
 85. See, e.g., id. at 569 (expressing reluctance to “lay down a general standard” for all 
cases in which an employee makes statements critical of his supervisors given “the 
enormous variety of fact situations”); id. at 573 (reaching its conclusion in light of “the[] 
circumstances” of the case); id. at 574 (holding that the First Amendment protects a 
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balance reached might be different if a variety of other factors were 
present.86 Accordingly, an employee who criticizes a direct supervisor 
or coworker or speaks on an issue that is directly related to his job 
duties might find that the Pickering balancing test results in an 
unfavorable outcome.  
Since Pickering, the Supreme Court has placed additional 
obstacles in the way of any successful First Amendment claim a 
public employee might make.87 In Connick v. Myers,88 the Supreme 
Court held that a court must first determine as a threshold matter 
whether the speech at issue involves a matter of public concern 
before conducting Pickering’s balancing test.89 The Court explained 
that government employers must be given “wide latitude” to restrict 
employee speech that does not involve a matter of public concern 
because federal courts should not get involved in personnel decisions 
regarding employee speech that involves a matter “only of personal 
interest.”90 To determine whether speech satisfies this public concern 
requirement, Connick instructed courts to consider the “content, 
form, and context” of the speech at issue.91 Relevant factors might 
include whether the speech is directed to a public or private audience 
 
teacher’s speech “in a case such as the present one” where the comments were only 
“tangentially” related to employment). 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 570 n.3 (noting the possibility of a different result in cases where 
“the need for confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public statements 
might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal,” or where the employer and supervisor 
have such a “personal and intimate” working relationship such that any criticism would 
undermine the effectiveness of that relationship); id. at 572 (noting the possibility of a 
different result in a case where the employee has greater access to the real facts than the 
general public); id. at 573 n.5 (noting the possibility of a case where a teacher’s statements 
“are so without foundation as to call into question his fitness to perform his duties in the 
classroom”); id. at 574 n.6 (noting the possibility of a different result if the employee’s 
statements were intentionally or recklessly false).  
 87. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, the Court also watered down public 
employee speech rights in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 
429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (requiring employees to prove that their speech motivated the 
decision to discipline). To be fair, some of the Court’s decisions in this area have been 
favorable for public employees. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 379–80, 383 
(1987) (protecting the constitutional right of a clerical employee in the constable’s office 
to say after Reagan assassination attempt, “[i]f they go for him again, I hope they get 
him”); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 411–13 (1979) (protecting a 
teacher’s complaints to the principal about racial discrimination at school). 
 88. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 89. For a more complete discussion of Connick and the confusion surrounding the 
public concern inquiry, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty 
Government Employees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117, 2125–27. 
 90. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–47. 
 91. Id. at 147–48. 
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and whether the speech calls for a specific change in the employee’s 
working conditions or invites a broader public debate concerning a 
government entity.92 
Most recently, in its 2006 decision Garcetti v. Ceballos,93 the 
Court held that a government employee has no First Amendment 
rights at all when he is speaking “pursuant to [his] official duties.”94 
Garcetti invoked the old Holmesian principle that citizens who 
become government employees “by necessity must accept certain 
limitations on [their] freedom” so their employers can provide 
services efficiently.95 The Court explained that restricting speech that 
owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities 
does not implicate the First Amendment because the government has 
a right to control what the government itself has created.96 Garcetti 
expressly left open the question of whether the doctrine of academic 
freedom provides teachers with some First Amendment rights in their 
scholarship or teaching.97 Even prior to Garcetti, however, lower 
courts have been reluctant to recognize the protections of academic 
freedom for K-12 teachers.98 
 
 92. See id. (distinguishing between speech that is merely of personal interest to the 
employee and speech that is of public interest). 
 93. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 94. Id. at 421. 
 95. See id. at 418 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the Court’s return to the 
Holmesian approach, see Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the 
Right-Privilege Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 907, 943–
44 (2011). 
 96. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22 (“[W]hen the government appropriates public funds 
to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.” (quoting 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))). 
 97. Id. at 425 (recognizing that the First Amendment might provide protection for 
speech in the academic environment for which the public employee framework does not 
account). 
 98. See, e.g., Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(refusing to apply Garcetti in a case involving a high school teacher because “[t]he Court 
explicitly did not decide whether [Garcetti applies] . . . to a case involving speech related to 
teaching”); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(rejecting academic freedom for K-12 teachers); see also Sheldon Nahmod, Academic 
Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 54, 63–64 (2008) (arguing 
that Garcetti has little effect on K-12 teachers because “courts have uniformly ruled, 
before and after Garcetti, that teachers in elementary and secondary education do not 
have a First Amendment right of academic freedom to decide for themselves what should 
be taught and how”); Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
1048, 1050 (1968) (arguing that although at the K-12 level “there is no strong tradition of 
intellectual freedom comparable to that which has characterized the development of the 
college and university,” the quality of instruction requires freedom in the classroom and 
intellectual integrity). 
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The Supreme Court has decided three cases involving 
public employee “off duty” speech that did not directly relate to 
work. In United States Civil Service Commission v. National 
Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (“Letter Carriers”),99 the 
Court upheld provisions of the Hatch Act, which prevents all federal 
government employees from engaging in campaign activity.100 The 
Court applied Pickering’s balancing test and upheld the law, deferring 
to Congress’s judgment that the rule is important to ensure that 
government employees enforce and execute the law without 
favoritism to a political party, to avoid the appearance of such 
favoritism, and to protect government employees from coercion to 
perform political acts in order to “curry favor” or maintain 
employment.101 
In the second case, United States v. National Treasury Employees 
Union (“NTEU”),102 the Court declined to give Congress the same 
broad deference lawmakers enjoyed in Letter Carriers and struck 
down a broad honoraria ban that prevented all federal employees 
from accepting compensation for their off-duty expressive 
activities.103 The Court applied the Connick/Pickering framework. It 
first held that the ban touched on matters of public concern, noting 
that because the ban applied to off-duty expression, it concerned 
speech employees make “as citizens.”104 The Court concluded that the 
expressive activities subject to the ban satisfied Connick’s public 
concern requirement because they “were addressed to a public 
audience, were made outside the workplace, and involved content 
largely unrelated to their Government employment.”105 Moving on to 
the Pickering balancing test, the Court stated that public employees 
have the right to engage in expressive activities on their own time “as 
citizens,” absent some government interest in restricting those 
activities that is “far stronger than mere speculation.”106 Unlike Letter 
Carriers, in which the Court upheld a broad ban on political 
campaigning, the Court declined to defer to Congress’s judgment and 
held that a broad honoraria ban was not sufficiently tailored to serve 
 
 99. 413 U.S. 548 (1973). 
 100. Id. at 550–51. 
 101. Id. at 564–67. 
 102. 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
 103. See id. at 457. 
 104. Id. at 465−66. 
 105. Id. at 466. 
 106. See id. at 465–66, 475 (citations omitted). 
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the government’s asserted interest in avoiding impropriety.107 With its 
broad definition of what constitutes a matter of public concern and its 
lack of deference to the government’s asserted reasons for the 
honoraria ban, NTEU appears to give government employees robust 
protection for their off-duty, non-work-related expressive activities. 
The third off-duty case, City of San Diego v. Roe,108 appears to 
have undermined the broad protection NTEU offered. In Roe, a 
police officer had listed for sale on eBay videos of himself “stripping 
off a police uniform and masturbating.”109 A per curiam Court 
opinion stated that two tests have emerged for evaluating public 
employees’ free speech claims: the Connick/Pickering framework, 
and then, from NTEU, a separate presumption of protection for 
expressive activities “on their own time on topics unrelated to their 
employment.”110 Roe stated that NTEU held that such speech is 
protected absent a significant government justification,111 but NTEU 
itself applied the usual Connick/Pickering framework.112 Some 
commentators have argued that, after Roe, the Connick/Pickering 
framework does not apply at all in off-duty, non-work-related cases,113 
although to date no lower courts have embraced this approach. 
B. Applying the Public Employee Framework in Social Media Cases 
Every step of the public employee framework outlined above 
offers potential obstacles for teachers who challenge adverse 
employment actions based on their social media communications. 
Garcetti left unclear when teachers are acting pursuant to their official 
job responsibilities as well as whether teachers enjoy any measure of 
 
 107. Id. at 472−77. 
 108. 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam). 
 109. Id. at 78. 
 110. Id. at 80. 
 111. Id. at 80–82. 
 112. See NTEU, 513 U.S. at 465–70. 
 113. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First 
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1463, 1468 (2007) (“City of San Diego, and 
its reading of NTEU, appear to place an outer limit on the additional power of the 
government over the speech of its employees. While that outer limit is a bit further from 
the workplace than one might have expected, at some point along the spectrum of work-
relatedness, the public employee apparently escapes the Connick-Pickering niche and 
recovers her freedom as a citizen vis-à-vis the government.”); Paul M. Secunda, Whither 
the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1108 (2008) (“The 
only thing that is apparently clear concerning the job-relatedness of speech is that public 
employee speech that occurs off-duty and is not work-related . . . does not come under the 
Pickering framework at all. Rather, under the NTEU line of cases, it is protected much 
like normal citizen speech.”). 
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academic freedom to soften the decision’s draconian effects. The 
Court’s decisions have also left unclear when social media 
communications will pass the Connick public concern test and 
whether the public concern test is even necessary when the speech is 
not work-related. Finally, even if teachers can survive Garcetti and 
Connick, they must overcome the uncertainty of the Pickering 
balancing test, where it is unclear how courts should evaluate the 
“value” of an employee’s speech and whether adverse public reaction 
is a relevant factor in evaluating the government’s interest in 
restricting the expression at issue. 
1.  Garcetti v. Ceballos 
Garcetti did not explain what it means for employees to speak 
“pursuant to their official duties” aside from mentioning that a job 
description is not dispositive and that “[t]he proper inquiry is a 
practical one.”114 Indeed, Garcetti expressly refused to give lower 
courts any guidance for defining the scope of an employee’s duties.115 
As a result, lower courts disagree about whether Garcetti applies 
when an employee’s speech is not required by, but is related to, his 
job duties.116 This question could arise in a number of different ways 
in the social media context. 
First, it is unclear whether a teacher’s decision to use social 
media as a pedagogical tool is “pursuant to official duties” when a 
teacher is not “required” to do so. To date, only one court has 
addressed this issue. In Spanierman v. Hughes,117 a high school 
teacher claimed he “used his MySpace account to communicate with 
students about homework, to learn more about the students so he 
could relate to them better, and to conduct casual, non-school related 
discussions.”118 The Spanierman court held that as long as a teacher is 
not required to use social media, Garcetti does not apply.119 It is not 
 
 114. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 424–25 (2006). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Compare Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692–94 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that Garcetti barred an athletic director’s First Amendment claim challenging his 
termination after he wrote a memorandum to the principal questioning use of athletic 
funds and reasoning that although the director was not required to write this letter, he 
wrote it in his capacity as an employee, not a citizen), with Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1332–33 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that speech of a school 
superintendent was protected by the First Amendment because although her statement 
was related to her employment, it “fell sufficiently outside the scope of her office”). 
 117. 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 118. Id. at 298. 
 119. Id. at 309. 
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clear whether all courts would adopt Spanierman’s approach to the 
applicability of Garcetti. In cases arising prior to Garcetti, some courts 
held that a school has a right to control not just the content of 
teachers’ lessons but also the pedagogical methods they use.120 
Indeed, some commentators have noted that school officials must 
have the same ability to control the content of the curriculum and the 
methods used to teach the curriculum because “[i]n many cases what 
is taught is indistinguishable from how it is taught.”121 For example, 
the Third Circuit has held that the First Amendment offered no 
protection to a teacher who used a pedagogical technique called 
“LearnBall,” which utilized attention-getting devices and rewards for 
student performance in an attempt to improve productivity, 
motivation, and behavior.122 Teachers who use social media for the 
reasons discussed in Part I.A—to improve communication with 
students individually and as a class, to promote creativity and 
collaboration, to promote student engagement and motivation, etc.—
are using social media as a pedagogical tool. Garcetti might give 
schools absolute authority to prevent or restrict their teachers’ use of 
social media in this manner.  
Answering the Garcetti question might depend upon how a 
teacher is using social media. It is not much of a stretch to view 
discussions of homework assignments on social media as part of a 
teacher’s job duties; it is less clear whether more casual conversations 
with students on social media are considered part of a teacher’s job. 
As the facts of Spanierman demonstrate, a teacher might use social 
media to have a mix of school-related and non-school-related 
exchanges with her students. Unfortunately, even before social media 
 
 120. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(“In this case, it is undisputed that defendants have determined that Learnball is not an 
appropriate pedagogical method. They are entitled to make this determination.”); see also 
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 723–24 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(upholding dismissal of a teacher who permitted students to use profanity in the 
classroom); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 707–09 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not give protection to a professor terminated because the university 
administration did not approve of her teaching methods and educational philosophy, 
which included giving students more responsibility to organize in-class and out-of-class 
assignments); Ahern v. Bd. of Educ., 456 F.2d 399, 403–04 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that a 
teacher has no First Amendment right to use a nonconventional teaching method that 
attempted to “shift[] to students many decisions customarily made by teachers”).  
 121. Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School 
Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1356 n.144 (1976).  
 122. Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1174, 1176 (holding that a school has the right to determine 
what is not an appropriate pedagogical method). 
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complicated the issue, it was unclear how much protection a teacher 
receives for “extracurricular” comments to students, whether they 
take the form of stray remarks during class or noncurricular 
expressive activities before or after school, between classes or during 
the lunch period, at school assemblies or athletic events, or on school 
bulletin boards.123 For example, the Seventh Circuit recently held that 
Garcetti barred a First Amendment claim brought by a teacher who 
was fired for making a stray remark in class that revealed her 
personal anti-war beliefs.124 Similarly, most courts—although not all—
have applied Garcetti in cases where teachers used bulletin boards 
inside their classrooms or elsewhere in the school to post material not 
directly related to the curriculum.125 
Indeed, it is not even clear whether Garcetti would apply if a 
teacher used social media to communicate with students about solely 
non-school-related topics. The line between “curricular” speech that 
the school has a right to control as government speech and 
“extracurricular” speech that retains at least some First Amendment 
protection is unclear at best. Some courts have held that a school 
retains the right to control what a teacher says to students not just 
during class time or in their classrooms but any time those students 
are required to be at school, including in between classes or at school 
assemblies.126 In explaining that “teachers do not cease acting as 
teachers each time the bell rings or the conversation moves beyond 
the narrow topic of curricular instruction,”127 the Ninth Circuit has 
 
 123. See Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing First 
Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 37, 62–64 (2008) (noting that 
it is unclear whether Garcetti applies to “speech made outside of class to students, such as 
in the hall between classes, during the lunch period or perhaps even after school”). 
 124. Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478–80 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(applying Garcetti to bar a teacher’s First Amendment claim challenging her dismissal 
based on her expression of anti-war sentiment during a class discussion of current events). 
 125. See, e.g., Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 171 n.13 (3d Cir. 
2008) (holding that if Garcetti applies in an educational context, it would bar a First 
Amendment claim of a football coach who participated in student-led prayer in the locker 
room); Caruso v. Massapequa Union Free Sch. Dist., 478 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (declining to grant summary judgment based on Garcetti in a case where a teacher 
posted a picture of George Bush on a classroom bulletin board); see also Downs v. L.A. 
Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1006, 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a teacher’s 
claim, prior to Garcetti, where the teacher claimed he had a First Amendment right to post 
on a bulletin board in the school’s hallway materials objecting to the school’s gay and 
lesbian awareness month, as posting on the bulletin boards constituted government 
speech). 
 126. See, e.g., Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 967–68 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 127. Id. 
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explained that teachers are “never just . . . ordinary citizen[s]”128 given 
“the position of trust and authority they hold and the impressionable 
young minds with which they interact.”129 Some courts have similarly 
held that teachers continue to speak as employees when they hold 
“optional” class sessions or meetings off school grounds.130 A possible 
argument based on these cases is that it is essentially impossible for a 
teacher to communicate directly with students without the students 
(and the larger school community) regarding this speech as 
representing the voice of the school. Other courts have defended the 
right of teachers to communicate as “private” citizens with students 
after school hours, even if on school grounds.131 
Accordingly, it is possible that the government (whether a 
school, school district, county, or state) would attempt to rely on 
Garcetti to defend either its decision to punish a teacher for social 
media communications with students or the constitutionality of social 
media bans or restrictions that prevent teachers from having such 
conversations at all. The likelihood of the government prevailing on 
this issue will depend on how broadly a court interprets Garcetti’s 
scope. It will be harder, although not impossible, for the government 
to rely on Garcetti to defend a policy that restricts or punishes a 
teacher for communications with students about topics that are not 
obviously school-related. 
2.  Public Concern Requirement 
Even if a teacher can survive the Garcetti threshold inquiry, 
many social media cases will struggle to survive the public concern 
test. First, some courts have held that speech involving curricular and 
pedagogical choices is not a matter of public concern because it is 
“nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute.”132 Other 
 
 128. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 129. Johnson, 658 F.3d at 968. 
 130. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1076 (11th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a professor’s 
First Amendment claim that his employer-university could not prohibit him from giving 
optional out-of-class lectures on the “Christian Perspective” that were connected to his 
coursework); see also Braswell v. Bd. of Regents, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1371, 1373, 1380 
(N.D. Ga. 2005) (denying First Amendment claims on qualified immunity grounds where 
a cheerleading coach allowed students to come to her home for optional prayer sessions). 
 131. Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that a teacher had a First Amendment right to attend with students a religious meeting 
held after school hours at school). 
 132. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty.  Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that a teacher’s First Amendment claim based on the selection of a play for 
students’ theatrical performance was not a matter of public concern); Kirkland v. 
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courts have disagreed.133 It is unclear how courts would apply the 
public concern inquiry in cases involving a teacher’s in-class 
noncurricular speech.134 This means that even if a teacher is punished 
for discussing political affairs with his students on social media, a 
court might hold that the speech is not a matter of public concern. 
Connick makes clear that complaining about work on social media is 
unlikely to pass the public concern test unless the speech presents 
broader issues of public importance.135 Social media communications 
that simply discuss personal information will also fail Connick’s 
test.136 
On the other hand, statements that clearly relate to matters of 
public concern are more likely to receive protection, even if they are 
offensive. For example, a school district in Florida initially suspended 
a teacher who wrote on his personal Facebook page “that gay 
marriage is a ‘cesspool’ that makes him vomit and mocks God,” but it 
later reinstated him, presumably because the school’s lawyers 
believed that the First Amendment would likely protect what the 
teacher said on his own time about a matter of obvious public 
 
Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that a claim based on 
a teacher’s selection of books for an optional reading list was an “ordinary employment 
dispute” and not a matter of public concern). 
 133. See, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1051–52 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(rejecting the argument that a teacher’s speech relating to curricular issues can never be a 
matter of public concern); Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (“[C]lassroom discussion is protected activity.”); see also Boring, 136 F.3d at 
378–79 (Motz, J., dissenting) (“Although [the claimant’s] in-class speech does not itself 
constitute pure public debate, obviously it does ‘relate to’ matters of overwhelming public 
concern . . . .”). 
 134. At least one judge has recognized the possibility that a teacher’s in-class 
noncurricular speech should be given more protection than a teacher’s in-class curricular 
speech. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 372–73 (Luttig, J., concurring). 
 135. See, e.g., Richerson v. Beckon, No. C07-5590 JKA, 2008 WL 833076, at *4 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 27, 2008), aff’d, 337 F. App’x 637 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a blog post 
criticizing a new employee and boss did not satisfy the public concern test); Leslie Brody, 
Paterson Teacher Suspended for Facebook Post Should Be Fired, Judge Rules, 
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.northjersey.com/news/Paterson_teacher 
_suspended_for_Facebook_post_should_be_fired_judge_rules.html?c=y&page=2 (reporti
ng an administrative law judge’s decision involving a teacher who said she felt like “a 
warden for future criminals”). 
 136. See, e.g., Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310–11 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(noting in dicta that a teacher’s communications with other users and his creative writing 
on MySpace did not touch on matters of public concern and that only a poem about the 
Iraq War satisfied the test); Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at 
*15–16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008) (holding that a student-teacher’s MySpace page contained 
only personal information and therefore failed the public concern requirement). 
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concern, especially because the school had failed to demonstrate that 
his speech caused any problems at school.137 
Courts currently disagree about whether the public concern 
requirement should apply at all in cases involving off-duty speech 
unrelated to the workplace.138 As Judge Richard Posner explained in 
one of the leading cases arguing against the public concern approach, 
“[t]he First Amendment protects entertainment as well as treatises on 
politics and public administration.”139 As a result, Posner continued, 
the government should be required to give a good reason for 
punishing an employee even for speech on matters of private 
concern.140 Posner suggested that in cases involving off-duty 
expression, courts should skip Connick’s public concern test and 
simply conduct a Pickering balancing test, where the value of the 
speech could be taken into account.141 Other courts have continued to 
apply Connick in off-duty cases but have taken a broader view of 
what constitutes a matter of public concern142 or have stated that the 
public employee framework is simply inapplicable.143 
3.  Pickering Balancing Test 
The outcome of the Pickering balancing test is entirely fact 
dependent and therefore uncertain. Although the test may 
appropriately balance the interests of teachers and students with 
respect to work-related expression, it offers insufficient protection for 
teachers’ non-work-related expressive activities. Specifically, on the 
“value” side of the balance, some courts have expressed concern that 
public employees will effectively have little right to engage in “free, 
uncensored artistic expression—even on matters trivial, vulgar, or 
profane”—if only political speech is given significant weight.144 
 
 137. See Padgett, supra note 9. 
 138. See Papandrea, supra note 89, at 2139−58 (providing a more extensive discussion 
of the confusion in the lower courts). 
 139. Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 140. Id. at 1027. 
 141. Id. at 1026–27. 
 142. See, e.g., Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 997–99 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that an 
officer’s nightclub music performances were a matter of public concern). 
 143. See, e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 n.5 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(refusing to apply the Pickering balancing test in a case involving a teacher’s private, off-
duty expression). 
 144. See Berger, 779 F.2d at 999−1000; see also Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 
1564–65 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that “it makes little sense” to apply the public concern 
test in cases involving nonverbal expression “that does not occur at work or is not about 
work”). 
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On the employer’s side of the balance, it is unclear whether 
courts should consider public reaction to an employee’s speech. In the 
education context, disruption often takes the form of students 
refusing to take a teacher’s classes, parental complaints that 
overwhelm the school’s administrative staff, and bad publicity more 
generally. Courts disagree over whether to take into account this sort 
of public reaction to the teacher’s speech. Some courts have held that 
actual or threatened disruption to the functioning of a government 
entity is an appropriate consideration.145 For example, the Second 
Circuit held that allowing the government to cite parental outrage 
when it was discovered that a teacher was a member of the North 
American Man/Boy Love Association (“NAMBLA”) was 
appropriate because, without the cooperation and participation of 
parents, “public education as a practical matter cannot function.”146 
Other courts have disagreed, noting that “[w]ith the greatest of 
respect to [complaining] parents, their sensibilities are not the full 
measure of what is proper education.”147 Along the same lines, some 
courts have explained that permitting consideration of the public’s 
reaction is equivalent to permitting a typically impermissible 
“heckler’s veto.”148 Some courts have tried to dodge the heckler’s 
veto issue by holding that the requisite disruption is shown not by the 
public reaction itself but rather the internal disruption caused in the 
government workplace when it has to divert its resources to respond 
to an adverse public reaction.149 
C. Applying Student Freedom of Speech Cases to Public School 
Teachers 
Although the Court has a well-developed (albeit unclear and 
overly complex) doctrine for analyzing the First Amendment claims 
 
 145. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 146. Id. at 199. 
 147. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361–62 (1st Cir. 1969) (extending First 
Amendment protection to a teacher’s decision to assign a magazine article containing the 
word “motherfucker” despite protests by parents). 
 148. See, e.g., Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1566−67 (“The Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
heckler’s veto lends support to our holding that the defendants have only an attenuated 
interest in preventing plaintiffs’ speech.”); Berger, 779 F.2d at 1001 (“Historically, one of 
the most persistent and insidious threats to first amendment rights has been that posed by 
the ‘heckler’s veto,’ imposed by the successful importuning of government to curtail 
‘offensive’ speech at peril of suffering disruptions of public order.”).  
 149. See, e.g., Eaton v. Harsha, 505 F. Supp. 2d 948, 969–70 (D. Kan. 2007) (recognizing 
an actual disruption to the internal functioning of a police department caused by having to 
respond to public criticism of an employee’s blog posts). 
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of public employees, some lower courts deciding cases involving 
public school teachers have applied the significantly different 
framework that has developed for student speech rights. 
A year after Pickering, the Court famously recognized in Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District150 that 
teachers and students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at 
the schoolhouse gate.”151 Nevertheless, the Court continued, these 
rights must be “applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment.”152 The Court concluded that a school can 
restrict student speech at school only if it “materially and 
substantially” disrupts the work of the school or invades the rights of 
others.153  
The Court’s subsequent cases have deviated from Tinker’s 
material disruption standard to impose greater restrictions on the 
speech rights of students. For example, students have no right to 
engage in lewd or obscene language at school154 or to engage in 
expression that school officials reasonably regard as advocating drug 
use,155 regardless of whether the speech disrupts school or interferes 
with the rights of others. In curbing student speech rights even when 
the expression does not disrupt the learning environment, the Court 
has explained that the process of education must not be “confined to 
books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by 
example the shared values of a civilized social order.”156 
Although some courts have invoked Tinker in cases involving 
teachers,157 in recent years the student speech decision upon which 
the lower courts most frequently rely is Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.158 In that case, the Supreme Court held that schools had 
broad authority over the “expressive activities that students, parents, 
 
 150. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 151. Id. at 506. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 513–14 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 154. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 155. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 156. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
 157. See, e.g., Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1056–57 (10th Cir. 1990) (“We find 
no reason here to draw a distinction between teachers and students where classroom 
expression is concerned.”); James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(applying Tinker to a teacher’s decision to wear an armband where the school made no 
showing that the armband interfered with school activities); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 
F. Supp. 352, 355–56 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (applying Tinker to the question of whether a 
teacher’s selections of reading materials for her students were appropriate). 
 158. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 
imprimatur of the school.”159 Hazelwood involved a challenge to a 
principal’s censorship of student-written articles about divorce and 
teen pregnancy slated to appear in the school newspaper.160 After 
concluding that the newspaper was not a public forum,161 the Court 
held that the school’s authority to restrict student speech was not 
limited to expression that substantially impeded its work or 
undermined the rights of other students.162 Instead, the Court held, 
educators are permitted to control student speech in school-
sponsored activities such as newspapers and theatrical productions 
that “may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, 
whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting,”163 
provided that “their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”164 The Court explained that giving schools 
broad deference to restrict student speech in school-sponsored 
activities “is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the education 
of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, 
teachers, and state and local school officials” and that judicial 
intervention under the First Amendment is permitted only when a 
censorship decision “has no valid educational purpose.”165 Given 
Hazelwood’s deferential “legitimate pedagogical concerns” test, 
teachers typically lose when courts apply that case to their classroom 
speech or curricular decisions.166  
Courts disagree on whether the student speech cases should play 
a role in analyzing First Amendment claims of teachers punished for 
 
 159. Id. at 271. 
 160. Id. at 263. 
 161. Id. at 267–70. 
 162. Id. at 271. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 273. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 456 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding unprotected a 
teacher’s discussion of abortion of Down’s Syndrome fetuses during class); Miles v. 
Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 778 (10th Cir. 1991) (upholding disciplinary action 
against a teacher who commented during class on rumors about two students fornicating 
on school grounds); see also Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 375–78 
(4th Cir. 1998) (Motz, J., dissenting) (arguing for a more rigorous application of the 
Hazelwood standard); Alan Brownstein, The NonForum as a First Amendment Category: 
Bringing Order out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored 
Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 775–76 (2009) (“[T]he range of concerns 
determined to be ‘legitimate’ and ‘pedagogical’ is so broad that one can only wonder 
whether anything meaningful is accomplished by requiring courts to ask and answer the 
question.”). 
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their curricular or pedagogical decisions or other forms of in-class 
speech.167 Although some courts have held that the public employee 
framework controls all teachers’ First Amendment claims,168 other 
courts instead have applied Hazelwood’s “legitimate pedagogical 
concerns” test169 or have applied an amalgam of the two 
approaches.170 To justify applying Hazelwood, lower courts have 
noted that the government employee speech cases fail to “address the 
significant interests of the state as educator.”171 Although recognizing 
that Hazelwood was a student speech case, some courts claim that the 
reasoning of the decision applies just as persuasively to teachers.172 
These courts note that a teacher’s classroom speech bears the same 
imprimatur of the school as a student contribution to the school 
newspaper.173 In addition, these courts argue that restricting teacher 
speech can be just as necessary as restricting student speech in order 
for a school to achieve its pedagogical goals174 and that the classroom 
is a nonpublic forum subject to reasonable restrictions.175 Others have 
argued in favor of Hazelwood because the public employee 
framework fails to “provide[ ] much assistance in assessing whether [a 
 
 167. For an in-depth analysis of the disagreement in the lower courts, see Emily Gold 
Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-
Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 79–87 (2008). 
 168. See, e.g., Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 168–69 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2008) (applying Pickering and Connick); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 
F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment does not permit teachers 
to stray from the school system’s curriculum); Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 
1036, 1048 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying the public concern balancing test). 
 169. See, e.g., Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 
1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir. 
1994); Ward, 996 F.2d at 453; Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1072–74 (11th Cir. 1991); 
Miles, 944 F.2d at 775. 
 170. See, e.g., Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694–96 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(applying both Pickering and Hazelwood); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 
F.2d 794, 795 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City, 
729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that a school can satisfy Pickering only when 
it can satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption standard); Columbus Educ. Ass’n v. Columbus 
City Sch. Dist, 623 F.2d 1155, 1159–60 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying the public employee 
framework but also noting that the teacher’s speech did not cause substantial disruption 
under Tinker). 
 171. See, e.g., Miles, 944 F.2d at 777. 
 172. See, e.g., id. 
 173. Ward, 996 F.2d at 453; Miles, 944 F.2d at 776; Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800–01. 
 174. See, e.g., Silano, 42 F.3d at 722; Miles, 944 F.2d at 777. 
 175. Ward, 996 F.2d at 453; Miles, 944 F.2d at 776; Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 
1071 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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teacher’s in-class speech] is entitled to constitutional protection.”176 
Connick’s public concern inquiry is unworkable, critics contend, 
because a teacher’s in-class speech is “neither ordinary employee 
workplace speech nor common public debate,” and the government’s 
interest in restricting teachers’ speech does not typically rest in 
concerns for “workplace efficiency or harmony” but rather a need to 
control speech for pedagogical reasons.177 
Garcetti’s bright-line rule eliminating First Amendment 
protection for speech made in the course of job duties means that 
courts no longer have to rely on Hazelwood to give schools robust 
authority to control the speech of their teachers in the classroom. 
Nevertheless, it remains important to consider the application of the 
student speech cases. Some courts have held that Garcetti does not 
apply in cases involving teachers because the Court expressly left 
open the possibility that teachers are afforded the protections of 
academic freedom.178 Furthermore, it remains unclear after Garcetti 
when a teacher is speaking as a citizen or as an employee. If Garcetti 
is interpreted narrowly, it may not apply in cases where a teacher is 
not required to use social media. Hazelwood, by contrast, may apply 
even if a teacher has not spoken pursuant to her official job duties as 
long as the teacher is using social media to communicate with 
students for at least partly pedagogical reasons179 and “students, 
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive [the 
speech] to bear the imprimatur of the school.”180 A court applying the 
deferential Hazelwood standard is likely to accept that concerns 
about maintaining the boundary between teachers and students 
justify restrictions on a teacher’s use of social media to communicate 
with students. It is unlikely that a court would apply Hazelwood in 
cases where a teacher is not communicating directly with her students 
because in such cases the speech is not part of the curriculum and 
does not reasonably bear the imprimatur of the school. 
Given that in many social media cases it may not be possible to 
use Hazelwood, the question then becomes whether courts might 
 
 176. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 378 (4th Cir. 
1998). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See, e.g., Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Dist., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(applying Pickering post-Garcetti).  
 179. See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 298 (D. Conn. 2008) (recounting 
how a teacher used social media to communicate with students about homework but also 
about non-school-related subjects in order to get to know the students better). 
 180. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
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invoke Tinker’s substantial disruption standard, or even the 
prohibitions on speech that contains lewd or suggestive language or 
advocates for illegal drug use.181 The Supreme Court has not 
determined whether the rules arising out of its student speech cases 
apply when students are not at school or participating in a school-
sponsored activity.182 If these rules can be applied to students’ off-
campus speech, it is possible that some courts will apply them to 
teachers’ off-campus speech. 
D. Which Framework is More Speech Protective? 
Courts disagree about whether the public employee or student 
speech framework provides more protection for teachers’ speech 
rights.183 With the relatively recent Garcetti decision stripping public 
employees of First Amendment protection for speech made pursuant 
to their job duties, teachers may find the public employee framework 
provides less protection, depending on how broadly a court interprets 
the job of a teacher. Furthermore, even if a teacher can survive 
Garcetti, it is unclear what, if any, protection the Pickering framework 
provides for speech that does not implicate a matter of public 
concern. The student speech framework does not have a bright-line 
rule rejecting First Amendment protection in cases that involve on-
the-job speech or matters of private concern. The only bright-line 
rules that come into play in the student framework are the 
prohibitions of lewd or profane speech or speech that advocates 
illegal drug use. 
On the other hand, the Pickering framework offers more robust 
protection for speech on matters of public concern because courts 
must balance the value of the speech against the school’s interest in 
restricting it.184 Hazelwood gives schools broad power to restrict 
speech that undermines a legitimate pedagogical goal without 
conducting any sort of balancing test that weighs the importance of 
the speech at issue; teachers can prevail only when school officials fail 
to offer a legitimate educational purpose.185 Tinker similarly does not 
require balancing but instead requires a school to demonstrate a 
 
 181. See supra notes 154–56 and accompanying text. 
 182. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1027, 1054–71 (2008) (discussing disagreement among lower courts). 
 183. See Waldman, supra note 167, at 86. 
 184. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  
 185. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; see supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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threat of substantial disruption.186 That said, courts conducting the 
Pickering balancing test may end up reaching the same conclusion as 
a court using Hazelwood if these courts give little weight to a 
teacher’s expression and great deference to a school’s asserted 
pedagogical interests. As a result, Tinker may offer the most 
protection because a school must demonstrate not just interference 
with its pedagogical interests but threatened disruption to the school 
environment.187 
III.  PROPOSED APPROACH 
As the prior Part demonstrated, it is clear that the First 
Amendment rights of public school teachers stand on unstable 
ground. The application of Hazelwood and Garcetti to teacher speech 
threatens to strip teachers of First Amendment protection for any 
speech they might direct toward their students, whether inside or 
outside the classroom. It is also unclear what, if any, constitutional 
protection teachers have for speech unrelated to their job duties when 
it does not implicate a matter of public concern or when it engenders 
a hostile community reaction. The lower courts’ disagreement about 
whether the public employee cases adequately take into account the 
unique circumstances of the school environment has only added to 
the confusion. 
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between laws or 
regulations that prohibit teachers from using social media as a 
pedagogical tool and broader restrictions that prohibit teachers from 
using social media to communicate with students about both 
curricular and extracurricular subjects. Social media policies that 
focus solely on the use of social media as a pedagogical tool stand a 
much better chance of surviving constitutional scrutiny under current 
doctrine than broad policies that forbid teachers from using social 
media to communicate with students for any purpose. Most current 
social media bans and restrictions, however, are broad policies that 
prohibit teachers from using social media to communicate with their 
 
 186. See, e.g., Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.4 (5th Cir. 
1980) (ruling in favor of a teacher after rejecting the school district’s argument that Tinker 
should apply in a case involving a controversial pedagogical method). 
 187. Some scholars have noted that if the Pickering balancing test is applied vigorously 
so as to require the same sort of substantial disruption Tinker requires, the tests may not 
be very different. See Paul Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 122 n.184 (2006) (arguing that the Pickering balancing test is 
really equivalent to a substantial disruption test and accordingly not much different from 
Tinker).  
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students not merely as part of the educational enterprise but for any 
purpose whatsoever. These policies fail constitutional scrutiny no 
matter what analytical framework is used to analyze them, whether 
the student speech framework, the public employee framework, or 
the time, place, and manner doctrine. 
 Teachers should enjoy robust First Amendment rights when 
they use social media networks in a noncurricular manner. Rather 
than applying the student speech framework, courts should apply a 
significantly revised public employee framework. Garcetti should be 
applied narrowly so that it applies only in cases where teachers use 
social media to communicate with students for curricular purposes. 
Moreover, Connick’s public concern inquiry should be eliminated 
because it permits schools to restrict teacher speech without having to 
make any showing that the speech interferes with the educational 
mission in any way. Furthermore, in cases involving non-work-related 
expression, courts should abandon the Pickering framework entirely. 
Instead, courts should afford such speech presumptive constitutional 
protection that can be overcome only when the school can 
demonstrate a substantial nexus between the challenged expression 
and the teacher’s ability to perform her job. This nexus requirement 
will be more easily met in cases involving a teacher’s direct 
communications with students because schools have a much stronger 
and more legitimate interest in restricting what teachers say directly 
to students than they do when students are not the intended audience. 
This proposed “nexus” test revises the public employee doctrine in a 
way that simultaneously recognizes the right of schools to take a 
teacher’s “off-duty” speech into account in determining whether a 
teacher is fit for the classroom and provides teachers with adequate 
breathing space for their expressive rights when they are speaking as 
citizens. 
A. The Need to Reform and Clarify the Doctrinal Framework for 
Teachers’ First Amendment Rights 
In determining the appropriate framework for analyzing the free 
speech rights of teachers, it is important to establish at the outset that 
teachers and students should be treated differently, particularly with 
respect to speech that takes place outside of the classroom. As others 
have noted, one simple reason why the Court’s student speech 
jurisprudence should not apply to teachers is that these cases all 
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involved students.188 More significantly, teachers and students are not 
similarly situated. Applying student-centric speech rubrics to 
teachers’ claims undervalues teachers’ status as educators, 
professionals, and citizens.189 
The courts do not need a special test for teachers distinct from 
the test that applies to public employees generally. The framework 
for analyzing the First Amendment rights of public employees 
already takes into account the special needs of the government to 
control the speech of its employees. Indeed, the public employee 
framework has been applied to teachers, as was the case in Pickering. 
Although Hazelwood does not bar all First Amendment claims 
relating to work-related expression or involving a matter of public 
concern, its deference to a school’s legitimate pedagogical interests 
gives the government more power than necessary to control the 
speech of its employees. What is needed is a reconsideration of the 
public employee framework, not a complete rejection of it in favor of 
a doctrine developed for a different population. 
Although teachers should be treated like public employees, the 
current framework for public employee speech rights requires 
significant revisions. The draconian threshold tests of Garcetti and 
Connick have already proven unworkable and should be eliminated. 
In cases involving non-work-related expression—in other words, 
cases in which the speech is not made in the scope of a teacher’s 
professional duties and does not discuss school matters—courts 
should not apply Pickering’s balancing test. Instead, courts should 
give the speech presumptive constitutional protection that can be 
overcome only if school officials can demonstrate a substantial nexus 
between the expression and the teacher’s fitness and ability to 
perform his job. 
 
 188. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 167, at 66 (“Hazelwood was a student speech case, 
and its rationale and approach are uniquely suited to that context.”); Alexander Wohl, 
Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering with Teachers’ First 
Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1309–10 (2009). 
 189. See Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First 
Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 13 (2001) (“The use of an undifferentiated standard for 
students and teachers ignores the legal distinctions and different level of constitutional 
protection afforded to children and adults, resulting in insufficient protection for teacher 
speech and contributing to the denigration of teachers as professionals.”); see also 
Waldman, supra note 167, at 79–87 (discussing the division among the circuits as to 
Hazlewood’s reach). 
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1.  Limit Garcetti 
As noted above, courts have struggled since Garcetti to 
determine when an employee is speaking “as an employee” 
performing official job duties or “as a citizen.”190 The problems with 
Garcetti are both theoretical and practical. As a theoretical matter, 
public employees do not cease to be citizens even when they are 
performing their jobs, and they do not cease to be employees when 
they are away from work. The foundation for Garcetti is the 
government speech doctrine and the idea that the government has a 
right to control whomever is speaking for it. Although this concept 
may have a workable application in some contexts—such as a 
government spokesperson—in many professions, like teaching, no 
reasonable person would regard all expression in the classroom as 
representing the official views of the employer. It is one thing if a 
teacher decides not to teach the subjects and material designated in 
the school curriculum. It is quite another to assume that every stray 
remark a teacher makes in class, on a school bulletin board, or to a 
student in between classes is government speech that the school is 
entitled to control without limit. 
As a practical matter, it is not easy to determine when Garcetti 
applies, particularly in the educational context and especially in cases 
involving social media. The Court stated that Garcetti applies 
whenever an employee is performing official job duties, but lower 
court decisions have revealed how difficult it is to determine the 
scope of those duties.191 It is particularly difficult to determine when a 
teacher is speaking pursuant to her job duties. Even when a teacher 
communicates with students about topics that are not directly school 
related, these kinds of interactions can play an important role in the 
educational process, especially in the primary and secondary school 
context. Social media makes it even more difficult to determine when 
a teacher is speaking pursuant to her job duties because a court 
cannot rely on temporal and geographic clues to draw a line between 
“teacher” and “citizen.” A teacher can use social media to 
communicate with students from any location, at any time of day or 
night.  
Garcetti expressly left open the question of whether teachers are 
entitled to the protections of academic freedom under the First 
 
 190. For a discussion of issues arising since Garcetti, see supra text accompanying notes 
114–31. 
 191. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
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Amendment, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve that 
issue fully.192 That said, it would make sense to give teachers some 
protection for the decision to use social media as a pedagogical tool. 
Although in some cases teaching methods may arguably interfere 
with the right of state and local communities to make value 
judgments regarding what they want their students to learn in the 
public schools, the use of social media does not, by itself, pose any 
threat to any discernable value judgment a community might make. It 
would be one thing if a school district were to ban a particular social 
networking website because it somehow conflicts with asserted 
community values or, if in a particular instance, school officials 
determined that the use of social media has disrupted the learning 
process or impaired classroom discipline. It is quite another to 
maintain a generally applicable policy that prohibits teachers from 
using social media in their teaching.  
But because most, if not all, current social media policies do not 
merely limit curricular uses, it is not necessary to resolve the issue of 
whether teachers should have some right to decide how to teach a 
subject (distinct, perhaps, from any right to decide what should be 
taught). This Article merely argues that Garcetti should be read 
narrowly such that it does not apply when a teacher uses social media 
to communicate with students for noncurricular purposes. Although 
in some cases it may be difficult to draw a line between the curricular 
and noncurricular use of social media, courts should define curricular 
use as narrowly as possible such that it applies only in cases where 
students are required to use, view, or post content on social media to 
complete an assignment or participate in a class activity, not when 
teachers have more informal communications with their students 
through social media, even if about school-related matters.193 
 
 192. For discussion of whether teachers are entitled to the protection of academic 
freedom under the First Amendment, see generally Theresa J. Bryant, May We Teach 
Tolerance? Establishing the Parameters of Academic Freedom in Public Schools, 60 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 579 (1999); Daly, supra note 189; Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy: 
Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687 
(2011); Nahmod, supra note 98; Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn 
in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational 
Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62 (2002); W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic 
Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301 (1998). 
 193. Under this approach, the manner in which the teacher in Spanierman acted would 
seem to follow outside of Garcetti, but more facts are needed to make that determination. 
It appears that the teacher primarily used social media to get to know his students better, 
but the record indicates that he also communicated with students about their homework. 
Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 282, 298 (D. Conn. 2008). If students were 
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2.  Discard Connick 
The Court should also discard Connick’s threshold public 
concern requirement. Even if it were possible to develop a workable 
standard to determine whether expression involves a matter of public 
concern, carving out from First Amendment protection all expression 
that does not satisfy this standard grossly undermines the First 
Amendment rights of employees without any demonstrated 
governmental need to restrict speech. 
Connick itself involved work-related speech, and by limiting First 
Amendment protection to work-related speech that involved a matter 
of public concern, the Court hoped to prevent the 
constitutionalization of employee grievances.194 Some courts applied 
the public concern requirement to strip teachers of First Amendment 
protection for any of their expressive activities related to the 
classroom.195 The public concern requirement also undermines the 
constitutional protection for teachers’ off-duty expressive activities. 
Determining what speech constitutes matters of public concern is a 
difficult inquiry. Cases involving teacher complaints about their 
students and schools on social media illustrate this difficulty perfectly. 
Although such comments may correctly be regarded as a teacher 
simply complaining about her job, in many cases these comments can 
equally be taken as providing important insights into the workings of 
the public school system. A threshold public concern inquiry 
potentially chills valuable speech without requiring any showing that 
the expression affects the government’s ability to conduct its mission. 
The unfairness of Connick’s threshold requirement is most 
apparent in cases involving non-work-related expression, which is 
frequently what appears in social media cases. The Supreme Court 
has left unclear whether the public concern inquiry applies in this 
context, and lower courts are divided on the issue.196 The courts that 
are unwilling to extend the public concern test in off-duty cases 
correctly recognize that the First Amendment has always protected 
much more than simply expression about political and governmental 
affairs. Although speech on matters of public concern is generally 
regarded as having high First Amendment value, speech on matters 
 
required to communicate with the teacher via social media to discuss their homework, the 
use would be curricular, but facts we do know suggest that all the communications the 
teacher had with his students were informal and primarily not related to school.  
 194. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). 
 195. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 138–43. 
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of private concern can be equally as valuable to the speaker and 
listener. 
B. Broad Social Media Bans and Restrictions 
Laws or rules restricting or banning teachers from using social 
media to communicate with their students for noncurricular purposes 
should be struck down as unconstitutional. These rules fail 
constitutional scrutiny regardless of whether a court applies the 
public employee framework, Hazelwood, or a time, place, and 
manner test. 
Under the current public employee framework, the school would 
argue that the First Amendment does not give a teacher the right to 
use social media for pedagogical purposes (because the 
communications relate to work duties and therefore Garcetti will 
most likely apply)197 or that communications to students necessarily 
fail Connick’s public concern test. The problem is that most if not all 
of the current social media policies do not merely restrict the use of 
social networks for pedagogical purposes.198 Accordingly, Garcetti 
likely will not bar a facial challenge unless a court takes the unlikely 
position that any communication a teacher has with a current student 
is part of the teacher’s job.199 Connick is also unlikely to support these 
laws and regulations because they tend not to have any exceptions for 
communicating with students about non-school-related topics that 
may be of great public concern. Such communications can be of great 
value, and a school does not have an interest in preventing all of 
them. Similarly, social media bans or restrictions are likely to fail the 
Pickering balancing test for the same reason the honoraria ban in 
NTEU failed that test: the rules are not sufficiently tailored to serve 
the government’s interest. 
Hazelwood is also unlikely to provide much support for these 
restrictions. Even if a court were willing to hold that all 
communications a teacher has with his students are somehow related 
to the curriculum and bear the imprimatur of the school, the broad 
social media restrictions that schools have adopted do not serve a 
legitimate pedagogical goal. Although some courts have given schools 
broad authority to control not just course content but also the 
 
 197. For a discussion of the restrictions public employers are allowed to place on their 
employees, see supra Part II.A. 
 198. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 199. Laws or policies like Missouri’s that also ban communications with former 
students are even less likely to find protection under Garcetti. 
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educational tools used to communicate that content,200 most of the 
social media bans in place today go far beyond restricting the use of 
social media as a pedagogical tool.201 Furthermore, even social media 
policies limited in this manner could have a difficult time surviving 
Hazelwood because courts might be unwilling to accept a school’s 
assertion that it is necessary to ban teachers from communicating with 
students through social media. Using social media to communicate 
with students is not an inherently bad thing; indeed, as discussed in 
Part I, many educators increasingly regard social media as providing a 
multitude of educational benefits. 
Only one court to date has addressed the constitutionality of a 
social media ban without applying either the public employee 
framework or Hazelwood.202 That court, sitting in Missouri, applied 
the traditional time, place, and manner test and entered a preliminary 
injunction striking down a state law that prohibited teachers from 
using any non-work-related social networking site that allowed 
“exclusive access”203 to current and former students, holding that “the 
breadth of the prohibition is staggering.”204 Under the time, place, 
and manner test, restrictions on a medium of communication are 
constitutional as long as they serve a substantial government interest, 
the government interest “is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression,” and the restriction is no greater than necessary to serve 
that interest.205 The court noted that social media is often the only 
way that teachers can communicate with their students.206 In addition, 
the broad ban would prohibit teachers from talking to their own 
children who are students.207 
The Missouri court was correct to conclude that the broad social 
media ban at issue in that case failed the time, place, and manner test. 
Social media bans like Missouri’s do not restrict what teachers can say 
to students; instead, they single out a particular mode of 
 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 120–21. 
 201. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 202. See Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction at 2–3, Mo. State Teachers 
Ass’n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553 (Mo. Cir. Aug. 26, 2011), 2011 WL 4425537. 
 203. S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). The statute defines 
“exclusive access” as occurring when “the information on the website is available only to 
the owner (teacher) and user (student) by mutual explicit consent and where third parties 
have no access to the information on the website absent an explicit consent agreement 
with the owner (teacher).” Id. 
 204. Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 202, at 2. 
 205. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 206. Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 202, at 2. 
 207. Id. 
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communication perceived as particularly dangerous. Although 
schools certainly have a substantial interest in maintaining the 
boundaries between teachers and students, social media bans are not 
sufficiently tailored to achieve this goal. Even though the Missouri 
law was particularly problematic because it included former students 
and did not have an exemption permitting teachers to communicate 
with their own children, even more limited social media bans are 
constitutionally problematic because they restrict too much speech. 
Such bans would apply even if the teacher is part of the same social 
network with a student in a non-school-related organization, 
including religious, athletic, or political groups. 
Rather than banning or restricting communications between 
teachers and students on social media, schools should focus on 
restricting harmful communications themselves, regardless of the 
media in which they occur. Under the nexus approach outlined below, 
a school would be able to punish teachers for inappropriate 
communications with students. This approach permits teachers to 
take advantage of all the benefits social media has to offer while 
permitting schools to restrict speech that is truly harmful. 
C. Proposed Nexus Approach for Non-Work-Related Expression 
The public employee doctrine is based on the recognition that 
when the government is acting as an employer, it needs to have 
greater authority to restrict the speech of its employees than it does 
when it is acting as a sovereign attempting to restrict the speech of 
ordinary citizens. If Garcetti is read narrowly and Connick’s public 
concern requirement eliminated, Pickering’s balancing test does a 
respectable job of protecting teachers’ work-related expression. 
Comments that attack particular students, teachers, or administrators, 
for example, undermine the teacher’s ability to be trusted in the 
classroom and may undermine the teacher’s professional 
relationships in her school community. More general comments about 
the state of the school, administrative decisions, or the community 
may anger members of that community, but they are more likely to 
make a valuable contribution to public discussion about the school 
system and educational issues. 
With respect to non-school-related expression, however, courts 
should not apply Pickering but should instead adopt a test that offers 
presumptive protection for such speech that the school can overcome 
whenever it can demonstrate a substantial nexus between that speech 
and the teacher’s fitness and ability to perform his job. This proposed 
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test is refreshingly simple yet offers the government adequate 
authority to restrict a teacher’s speech when it is important to do so. 
A nexus approach finds support in cases in which teachers have 
been punished for their off-duty conduct. Considering the law in this 
area is especially relevant given that in many cases where teachers are 
punished for posting online content—such as Ashley Payne’s case 
involving drinking pictures208—it is hard to know whether the school 
is punishing the teacher for engaging in inappropriate speech or for 
the underlying conduct. Traditionally, courts evaluating challenges to 
conduct-based dismissals used a “role model” test to determine 
whether teachers can be punished for their off-duty conduct,209 but 
more recently courts have tended to embrace a nexus approach that 
requires schools to demonstrate that the challenged conduct directly 
affects the performance or effectiveness of the teacher.210 
Commentators have noted that this shift to a nexus test reflects “that 
over the years courts have come to be somewhat more protective of 
the personal lives of educators.”211 For example, there was a time 
when courts upheld the termination of teachers based on out-of-
wedlock pregnancies or sexual orientation, but no court has reached a 
similar holding since the 1970s.212 In addition, although historically a 
school district might punish a teacher for drinking in public,213 
 
 208. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.  
 209. See, e.g., Toney v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 881 P.2d 1112, 1114 
(Alaska 1994) (“[I]t is well-established that there need not be a separate showing of a 
nexus between the act or acts of moral turpitude and the teacher’s fitness or capacity to 
perform his duties.”); Zelno v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit No. 12 Bd. of Dirs., 786 A.2d 
1022, 1024 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (permitting discharge for “immoral” conduct provided 
“that the conduct claimed to constitute immorality actually occurred, that such conduct 
offends the morals of the community, and that the conduct is a bad example to the youth 
whose ideals the teacher is supposed to foster and elevate”). 
 210. See, e.g., Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 386–87 (Cal. 1969) (listing 
factors a court can consider in determining whether a teacher is “unfit to teach”); Lehto v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Caesar Rodney Sch. Dist., 962 A.2d 222, 227 (Del. 2008) (requiring nexus). 
 211. See Ruth L. Davison, John L. Strope, Jr. & Donald F. Uerling, The Personal Lives 
and Professional Responsibilities of P-12 Educators: Off-Duty Conduct as Grounds for 
Adverse Employment Actions, 171 EDUC. L. REP. 691, 691 (2003). 
 212. Id. at 701 (out-of-wedlock pregnancy); id. at 703 (“[O]nly 30 year old cases 
demonstrate an employer prevailing in instances of adverse actions based on sexual 
orientation.”). Indeed, in 1974 the Supreme Court struck down a mandatory school board 
rule requiring all pregnant teachers—married or not—to take leave several months prior 
to the birth of the child. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 642–43, 651 
(1974). 
 213. See generally Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Twp. Sch. Dist., 6 A.2d 866 (Pa. 1939) 
(upholding termination of a teacher who worked part-time as a waitress and bartender 
and who drank and gambled in front of customers, some of whom were students). 
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modern courts are split on whether even a driving under the influence 
conviction can be a sufficient basis for termination.214 Accordingly, 
one ironic twist of the current state of the law is that a teacher like 
Ashley Payne might find that she is more likely to win a lawsuit if the 
school says it fired her for the underlying conduct—drinking—than if 
it says she was fired for posting a picture of that conduct on her social 
media profile.  
Courts should take care to examine both the validity of the 
school’s purported mission as well as the nexus between the school’s 
mission and the need to restrict the teacher’s speech under review. 
Courts should not be permitted to assert that the challenged 
expression shows a lack of judgment or sets a bad example. 
Furthermore, community outrage alone should be insufficient to 
demonstrate inability to perform a job. Although community reaction 
may be based on justifiable concerns about a teacher’s fitness, it may 
instead be based on intolerance for unpopular and minority opinions 
or unduly high standards for the way a teacher lives her life outside of 
work. 
In evaluating whether the nexus requirement is met, courts 
should take into consideration whether the teacher knowingly and 
directly communicated with students, perhaps by “friending” them on 
Facebook or by sending them direct messages on Twitter. As 
discussed in Part I, it is difficult for any social media user to guarantee 
that no one but the intended audience will see her comments. This 
concern is not present when a teacher is communicating directly with 
students. Furthermore, when a teacher has direct communications 
with students—whether through social media or in the school 
hallway—there is a greater concern that the teacher’s expression will 
have an undue influence on those students. In other words, it is 
important to distinguish between situations when a teacher like 
Ashley Payne posts drinking pictures on her social media profile 
without intending for her students to see them and those situations 
where a teacher intentionally sends such pictures to students. 
Although a teacher might not intend to communicate as a “teacher,” 
teachers should assume that their minor students will regard them in 
 
 214. Compare In re Termination of Kibbe, 996 P.2d 419, 424 (N.M. 1999) (stating that 
the school board’s termination of a teacher for a driving while intoxicated conviction and 
not cooperating with police was arbitrary and capricious because there was no evidence 
these actions had any relationship to the teacher’s competence as a teacher and coach), 
with Zelno, 786 A.2d at 1026 (upholding dismissal of a teacher convicted of drunk driving 
three times because her actions constituted immorality that was a bad example to youth). 
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that role—and be influenced accordingly—whenever they are having 
direct communications. Furthermore, inappropriate interactions with 
students—such as sexually charged conversations—can be sufficient 
on their own to indicate unfitness because they indicate, at best, that 
the teacher cannot maintain the appropriate boundary between 
teacher and student, and, at worst, that the teacher might sexually 
abuse students.215 
A school might still be able to satisfy the nexus requirement with 
respect to a teacher’s social media communications that are not 
directed at students, but it will be much more difficult to do so. The 
outcome of a nexus test does not depend on whether the teacher is 
speaking about a matter of public or private concern; instead, what 
matters is whether the communications reveal unfitness to serve as an 
educator. For example, any communications indicating sexual 
relations with a minor, or a belief that such relations are appropriate, 
would satisfy the nexus requirement because the school community 
reasonably would not be able to trust that teacher with minor 
children.216 Schools should also be able to punish teachers based on 
comments that reveal the teacher is not performing her job duties.217 
By contrast, pictures or communications regarding alcohol or drug 
use, revelations of unpopular political positions, the use of profanity, 
and pornographic pictures do not by themselves indicate unfitness for 
the educational profession.  
 To be sure, even under this proposed test, the First Amendment 
rights of teachers will remain somewhat uncertain from case to case, 
but its benefits far outweigh its costs. Under this approach, schools 
could not simply argue that a teacher’s speech reveals that she is a 
poor “role model” for students or that community outrage rendered 
the teacher ineffective. The nexus test is also preferable to the 
Pickering balancing test or the Tinker substantial disruption test. 
Pickering offers insufficient protection for speech that does not 
involve a matter of public concern because such speech is not valued 
and too easily outweighed by the school’s preferred reasons for 
silencing it. Tinker’s substantial disruption test is appealing but fails 
 
 215. Courts generally do not tolerate a teacher’s sexual misconduct with students or 
other minors without expressly finding a nexus, see Davison et al., supra note 211, at 691 
n.1 (citing a number of cases), but it is not difficult to imagine how a nexus requirement 
would be satisfied in such situations. 
 216. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 200 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding 
dismissal of a teacher who was a member of NAMBLA). 
 217. For example, schools should be able to punish teachers if they discover through a 
teacher’s confessions on social media that she took a sick day to go on vacation. 
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to take into account a school’s interest in disciplining teachers whose 
speech may not be disruptive but nevertheless indicates unfitness to 
teach. Rather than formally labeling teachers as speaking “as 
employees” or “as citizens,” the nexus approach recognizes that the 
two cannot be neatly separated. The proposed nexus test focuses on 
when a teacher’s speech truly undermines a school’s interests as an 
employer while respecting a teacher’s free speech rights as a citizen. 
CONCLUSION 
 Teachers around the country are increasingly finding 
themselves in trouble for their use of social media in and out of the 
classroom. In such cases, the application of the two potential legal 
frameworks to evaluate their First Amendment rights—the public 
employee doctrine and the student speech doctrine—are unclear and 
potentially grant schools an unjustifiable amount of power to restrict 
teachers’ speech. Teachers are also more frequently getting in trouble 
for posting content deemed inappropriate or unprofessional during 
their personal time. No doubt relying on the current uncertain yet 
plainly speech-restrictive state of the law, increasing numbers of 
school districts and legislative bodies have enacted laws and 
regulations that ban teachers from using social media to communicate 
with their students.  
This Article contends that no matter what legal framework is 
used, social media bans are unconstitutional because they do not 
merely forbid the use of social media for pedagogical purposes but 
restrict far more speech than is necessary to prevent inappropriate 
communications between students and teachers. Moreover, these 
bans fail to recognize the great value of social media as a pedagogical 
tool and a communicative platform. Instead of demonizing a mode of 
communication that is playing an increasingly important role in 
American society, schools should instead focus on restricting harmful 
speech itself. 
The doctrinal framework governing the First Amendment rights 
of teachers is in dire need of clarification and reform. This Article 
contends that the public employee speech framework should apply in 
all cases involving teachers, but this framework needs major revisions. 
Specifically, the Garcetti rule stripping public employees of all First 
Amendment protection for their work-related speech should be 
eliminated or at least narrowly construed so that it applies only when 
teachers are engaged in curricular expression. Connick’s public 
concern requirement should be eliminated because it gives schools 
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unwarranted control over their teachers’ speech. Finally, although a 
rigorous version of Pickering’s balancing test is appropriate for a 
teacher’s work-related expression, it offers insufficient protection for 
non-work-related speech. Instead, courts should give such speech 
presumptive constitutional protection but permit public educational 
employers to overcome this presumption by demonstrating a 
substantial nexus between the speech and a teacher’s ability and 
fitness to perform her professional duties. The increasing importance 
of social media as a communications platform renders these reforms 
more essential than ever. Teachers should not be required to use 
social media at their peril.  
 
 
 
